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Narrative in the Study of Victimological Processes in Terrorism
and Political Violence: An Initial Exploration
Antony Pemberton and Pauline G. M. Aarten
International Victimology Institute Tilburg, Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Narrative is intimately connected to victimization and radicalization.
Trouble, the notion that drives narrative, is often coupled with
victimization: the experience of suffering intentional harm. This
experience can play a turning point in the stories that radicals
construct about their own lives and thus play a role in their pathway to
radicalization. In this article, three main themes of narrative will be
further explored in relation to victimization and radicalization: identity,
emotions, and culture. Central in this article is the discussion on how
narrative can contribute to theory and research into victimological
processes in radicalization, while offering new means to further
develop key constructs.
In a recent article for debate in the journal Terrorism and Political Violence Marc Sageman1
voiced his concerns about the lack of progress in research into the processes of radicaliza-
tion. He states: “Despite over a decade of government funding and thousands of newcomers
to the ﬁeld of terrorist research, we are no closer to answering the simple question of ‘What
leads a person to turn to political violence?’” A similar question can be asked for those who
desist, as most members do leave political violent groups at some point.2 Despite the growing
number of studies on disengagement and deradicalization,3 we are even further away from
answering the question “What leads a person to desist from political violence?”
Why have scholars not yet answered these two questions? Sageman4 argues that there is
stagnation in terrorism research because governments are making the necessary primary—
but highly sensitive—data unavailable to academia. As a result, he states, a lack of primary
data has mainly resulted in an “explosion of speculations” in the ﬁeld of terrorism. Sage-
man’s assessment has led to a number of talking points by a group of scholars.5 While these
scholars agree that the question why people turn to political violence remains to be
answered, the lack of an answer is not the result of a stagnation of research in this ﬁeld.
Although Schmid6 argues that this question is unanswerable, terrorism research has reached
a new level of maturity, as we know more than ten years ago.
We think that an additional impetus to research in this area lies in narrative. Hammack
and Pilecki7 already argued that narrative should be viewed as the root metaphor for political
psychology and the speciﬁcs of political violence and terrorism give their argument
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additional weight for our ﬁeld. The argument that lies at the heart of this article is that narra-
tive can contribute to theory and research into phenomena of terrorism, political violence,
and radicalization, offering new means to further develop key constructs.
Narratives and counternarratives already feature in the body of research on terrorism and
violent political extremism.8 By and large, however, this solely concerns the message that
acts of terror and political violence convey or with which they are accompanied. This is an
important area of research, but the relevance of narrative research is considerably broader
than these explicit political stories. This article cannot address all the features of the “narra-
tive turn” in social sciences9 and how they might enrich the study of terrorism and political
violence. Instead, it will provide relatively brief sketches of the connection between narrative
and identity, emotion and culture, and focus on narratives of victimization in their connec-
tion to research and theory in terrorism and political violence. Where victims’ narratives are
addressed in the current literature on these topics, they exclusively refer to the use of the sto-
ries of victims of terrorism in counterterrorist efforts and/or as a means to ensure sufﬁcient
attention to their plight in policy and practice. These are important subjects, but victimologi-
cal narratives can also be key to understanding the behavior of perpetrators of these acts. The
latter is the interest in this article.
This article proceeds as follows. First, some key issues concerning narratives are discussed,
and why victimological narratives are of particular interest, also to gain further insight into the
behavior of perpetrators. Subsequently, it will examine in more detail three constructs central
to narratives: the centrality of narrative to identity,10 the role of narrative in emotions,11 and
the importance of narrative in connecting individual lives to the wider cultural context.12 Each
will be linked to the victimology of political violence and radicalization. In particular, this arti-
cle will discuss the relevance of narrative understanding of the identity implications of victimi-
zation to Kruglanski and colleagues’ notion of the signiﬁcance quest, how understanding the
complexity of emotions elicited by victimization can enrich the understanding of the develop-
ment of counterterrorist messages and how the impact of victimization on (severing) the con-
nection between individual life stories and the wider culture can provide insight into the
development and maintenance of violent extremist groups. These examples do not exhaust by
any means the range of topics that could be helpfully addressed by applying insights from nar-
rative theory and research to the topic of terrorism and political violence. They serve as prelim-
inary illustrations of the fruits that this interlinkage might bear.
Narrative and Victimology
According to Burke,13 all stories have at least in common that they contain an Agent who
performs an Action to achieve a Goal in a recognizable Setting by the use of certain Means.
What drives the story is a mismatch between the elements of this “pentad”: what Burke
refers to as “Trouble.” The story is one that is unexpected, and the plot and its resolution
must be seen in conjecture with the efforts of the characters in the story to cope with, resolve,
integrate, or overcome the unexpected event and its consequences.14
The understanding that narrative concerns an Agent, performing an Action to achieve a
Goal underlines Bruner’s view that narratives are fundamentally about “the vicissitudes of
human intention.”15 Events are not merely mentioned or described, but are causally con-
nected, at least from the point of view of the protagonist. In stories, causality is shaped in
terms of the intent of its characters. Bruner distinguishes the narrative mode of reasoning,
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which in his view people typically use to explain “how the human world works—how and
why, that is, human beings do what they do,”16 from the paradigmatic mode: the rational
analysis, logical proof, and empirical observation that forms the basis for scientiﬁc reasoning.
The importance of intent in narratives lays bare the connection to ethics and morality: in
narratives things happen for a reason, and this reason concerns either good or bad inten-
tions.17 Even if an event happened by chance, morality will still feature heavily in the narra-
tive, with the characters querying the lack of intent, or reason behind the event that shapes
their own further existence. Overall, the narrative imposes structure and sequences events in
such a fashion it becomes a coherent plot and that an evaluation of these events becomes
possible.18 As will be discussed later in this article, “getting a life,” that is, the construction of
a coherent life story is one of the most important elements of an individual’s personality
development from adolescence onward.19
The structure of narrative has a natural link to victimology. The experience of victimiza-
tion is a particular and poignant instance of the (intentional) “Trouble” that Burke
describes.20 Victims are confronted with the negative consequences of behavior at odds with
key ethical or moral values. This necessitates attempts to make sense of this behavior, which
occurs through narrative modes of cognition. This also becomes clear from the research that
reveals a so-called moralization gap between the victim’s perspective on a given event and
the way the perpetrator of the same event experiences this.21 Victims see the event as an
injustice, exaggerate the impact, minimize the context and extend the time frame of the event
forward and backward in time, while “perpetrators” tend to ﬁnd justiﬁcations for what hap-
pened, attribute the event to outside causes, minimize the impact on the victim and see the
event as a moment in time. The perpetrator’s perspective singles out immediate causes rather
than intentional (and countermoral) reasons in his or her own character. In Bruner’s terms,
the perpetrator’s perspective is in line with the logico-paradigmatic approach to understand-
ing the event rather than the narratively derived version the victim has constructed. The per-
petrator’s perspective is relatively shorn of narrative components: if intention is key to
narrative, the perpetrator’s emphasis on impersonal causes rather than intentional reasons
undermines the extent to which it can be accurately termed a story.
Important for the current discussion is that this also means that victimization narratives
can exert large inﬂuence on the self-understanding of those who are perpetrators of (politi-
cally motivated) offenses. Although their own acts of violence will lead them to be labeled
offenders, their life stories are riddled with victimization narratives that often loom largely
in their own explanations for and understanding of their behavior.22 Where this is the case,
any acts of perpetration of violence and crime are likely to be justiﬁed as logical reactions to
these experiences victimization narrative, seen as the a determined consequence of outside
forces, beyond the offender’s control and/or as temporary aberrations from otherwise moral
lifestyle. In sum, victimization narratives play a large role in perpetrator’s behavior, while
ﬁrst person accounts of that behavior itself remain wedded to the logico-paradigmatic mode
of thinking. It is for this reason that Baumeister maintained that when he “donned his scien-
tiﬁc spectacles,” he was in effect taking the perpetrator’s perspective on the moralization gap.
Narrative and Identity
A key area of narrative research concerns narrative understanding of identity. Research in
personality psychology gives credence to the view that life can be understood as narrative.
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McAdams23 argues that personality can best be seen as consisting of three levels. The ﬁrst
level, which McAdams terms the social actor, consists of traits, such as the well-known Big
Five.24 Level II is termed the motivated agent and concerns personal strivings, life tasks,
defense mechanisms, coping strategies, skills, and other motivational, developmental, or
strategic constructs. What differentiates the agent from the actor is that the former is contex-
tualized within time, place, and/or role. Whereas dispositional traits account for broad con-
sistencies in how people behave across situation and over time, personal goals and motives
address what people want (and fear) and how they strive to obtain what they want (and
avoid what they fear) in particular social and developmental contexts and with respect to
particular social roles.25
Level III involves identity narratives or self-stories, which McAdams calls the auto-
biographical author. This narrative identity draws on and is layered over traits and
adaptations. Key is the understanding that “beyond dispositional traits and characteris-
tic adaptations, human lives vary with respect to their integrative life stories or personal
narratives that individuals construct to make meaning and identity in the modern
world.”26 A narrative identity is an internalized, evolving, and integrated story of the
self. It reconstructs the past, present, and future in such a way to provide a person’s
life with unity, purpose, and meaning. Through narrative identity, “people convey to
themselves and to others who they are now, how they came to be, and where they
think their lives may be going in the future.”27 In other words, understanding the per-
son is understanding his or her story. McAdams and McLean28 link the development
of the three ways of understanding the self—the social actor, the motivated agent, and
the autobiographical author—to challenges associated with three different forms of self-
awareness. The social actor is tasked with overcoming the challenge of self-regulation
and the motivated agent with self-esteem. In addition to this the autobiographical
author offers the self a means to integrate different experiences and episodes in life:
through the coherent life story it constructs it provides the “I” with a continuous story
of “me” in space and time; in other words, it offers self-continuity. The self of today is
the self of yesterday and the self of tomorrow. Any changes also have retrospective
implications: events in the past are reinterpreted in the light of the current understand-
ing of a life story. The drive to achieve self-continuity means that the self-attempts to
bring the present in line with the past and vice versa.
Narrative Rupture and Radicalization
How does victimization play a role in a person’s narrative identity? A main link is
McAdams’s emphasis on the narrative attention demanded by speciﬁc nuclear episodes in
the construction of one’s life story.29 The storyteller is tasked with making meaning: explain-
ing the causes of the event, the role of the main protagonists, the consequences on him and
herself, and the further development of the story.30 Life stories are thrown into turmoil in
the event of severe forms of victimization. The victimization experience presents a narrative
rupture, which threatens the sense of self-continuity.31 How to understand the life preceding
the event as continuous with the present, the event itself and the future? The efforts to make
sense and meaning are concerned with coming to terms with the manner in which the past,
the victimization, the present, and the future can be reconceived anew to represent a coher-
ent and continuous whole. The narrative rupture also concerns the experience of being out
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of sync with the rest of society, with much of the worth of social support and acknowledg-
ment lying in their contribution to this recalibration.32
Understanding the importance of the level III personality dynamics, including the vic-
timological notion of the narrative rupture, can further inform the understanding of
Kruglanski and colleagues’ notion of the signiﬁcance quest, which is a key lens to understand
the process of radicalization.33 In Kruglanski et al.’s view, the key to understanding why a
person does or does not resort to political violence resides in the notion of counterﬁnality:
although a person might by motivated to achieve a given end, this end can also run counter
to other ends that this person may want to achieve and/or the norms that guide the ways in
which goals might be pursued. So where many people might agree with the analysis of a
given terrorist or radical group of the ends that should be reached, this can run counter to
the understanding that violence is not permitted, that there are other nonviolent means by
which the person could contribute to those goals and/or that taking up arms might make
leading a normal family life impossible and will interfere with pursuing a career. In
Kruglanski and colleagues’ view then, radicalization can be conceptualized by the degree to
which the radical’s goal trumps other meaningful purposes in life and/or norms that run
counter to the violent means by which this goal would need to be pursued. This means that
radicalization can occur through ampliﬁcation of the importance of the radical’s goal, the
muting of other goals, the increasing difﬁculty of achieving the goal through other means
and/or the muting of the norms that contradict the radical means to achieve the end. As
Kruglanski and colleagues note, this also helps to understand why it is difﬁcult to settle on a
deﬁnition of radicals and radicalization: where one case intense identiﬁcation with the focal
goal of the radical group is necessary to override other concerns, in another case it the lack
of norms or contradictory ends that motivates this behavior.
Kruglanski and colleagues introduce a general motivating force behind the focal goal,
which they describe as the quest for signiﬁcance: which means to matter, to receive respect.
In this light, the radicalization process, then, also includes the arousal of the goal of signiﬁ-
cance; identiﬁcation of terrorism and violence as the appropriate means to reach signiﬁcance
and a commitment shift away from other concerns toward the goal of signiﬁcance. The cen-
trality of signiﬁcance in their theory suggests that a triggering event might relate to experi-
enced signiﬁcance loss: that is, humiliation or deprivation, which appears particularly acute
when this relates not only to the individual, but also to the group to which the individual
belongs.
Even though Kruglanski and colleagues’ work does not refer to the body of literature dis-
cussed in the previous sections, this article argues that narrative psychology can be an added
value to this theory. Two points need to be made. First, it seems that Kruglanski and col-
leagues view radicalization on the levels of the social actor and the motivational agent, but
not on the level of the autobiographical author. Yet given the ideological component of radi-
calization and the coincidence of identity and ideology, narrative can offer a useful frame-
work of perceiving the pathways to radicalization and political violence. As Haidt, Graham,
and Joseph34 explain: “Level III centrally concerns identity, and more speciﬁcally identity as
experienced in a narrative mode. At this level, the stories people tell themselves and others
about how they came to hold the moral and political beliefs they currently hold should be
examined. These stories are not expected to be literally true as historical accounts, but it is
expected that they inﬂuence a person’s behavior, including political behavior such as voting,
and involvement in political movements.” And, in particular to radical, extremist political
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activity, including terrorist acts, the authors would hazard to conjecture. The nonbehavioral
components of radicalization can be understood along the dimensions of the extent of agree-
ment with given causes and the extent to which the ideology forms a component of some-
one’s identity. The extent to which the master narrative of the terrorist organization
coincides with the life narrative of an individual goes beyond mere attitudinal agreement: it
forges an identity based union.35
A second point is that Kruglanski et al.’s notion of signiﬁcance quest appears, not only
terminologically, to have a strong connection to the terrorist’s life narrative. Yet they view
this term solely in terms of attitudinal constructs and as a goal to which the self as a motiva-
tional agent aspires. Yet it is believed that the signiﬁcance quest is (also) an element of peo-
ple’s overarching life narrative. Like the choice for an occupation, a spouse or habitus, the
choice for this quest says more about a person than merely a strong preference: it says some-
thing about who they are, also to themselves.
Finally, the fact that the narrative rupture also applies to the connection with wider soci-
ety also can provide insight in important mechanisms that underlie the connection of vic-
timological processes to the signiﬁcance quest.36 The experience of lost connection between
one’s life story and the master narrative of society often leads to a view that only others with
similar experiences can understand one’s experiences. Together with these peers those
experiencing such a narrative rupture can engage in the co-construction of a smaller scale
community narrative.37 In turn this community narrative can replace (parts of) the role of
the cultural master narrative in the development of one’s identity, and form the basis for the
signiﬁcance quest.38 The narrative perspective thus provides both insights into the processes
by which this occurs, but also offers the view that narrative through which radicalization
occurs can be co-created by people living through the same victimization experiences.
Narrative and Emotions
As noted above, nuclear episodes are important components of a life story. They are critical
events that are often described as turning points in an individual’s life story. These events
have the capacity to trigger (strong) emotion(s) and thus emotions form the nucleus of a
narrative. The process model of Frijda39 views the trigger of emotion as an appraisal of a sit-
uation that is out of the ordinary. This appraisal is inherently evaluative: it relates probable
outcomes of the unexpected event to the individual’s concerns, thereby relating the event to
the individuals past and future selves. The autobiographical experience of victimization can
give rise to a whole host of emotions. Each of these emotions is associated with different
action tendencies. The emotion in question guides the appraisal of the situation and subse-
quently leads to radically different actions. The most obvious ones are related to anger,
which is the emotion associated with the experience of injustice, and can include vengeful-
ness, hatred, but also forgiveness, contempt, and disgust.40
Narrative also transmits emotions.41 According to Oatley’s taxonomy of emotional
response to literary narratives there are assimilative and accommodative schema. The former
concerns the empathic, interactional, and autobiographical responses noted above. Here, the
narrator can draw on the emotions of the reader/ listener to get the story across. The story
appeals to the reader’s curiosity, where “incompleteness can provoke arousal, and the reader
becomes engaged in assimilating new elements to the schema until completion and relief
occur.”42 A particular form of assimilative communication is covered by the concept of
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framing, in which a very brief narrative, often consisting of no more than a stereotypical
image, can be used to transmit a compelling argument to a proven and potentially receptive
audience.43 Framing relies on schemata shared by the communicator and the target of com-
munication. The frame supplies the material to deﬁne problems and their causes, to clarify
the moral issues involved and to point to suitable remedies. The most ambitious form of
framing, so-called frame transformation, attempts to substantially alter the manner in which
the target audience views a particular social or political issue.44 In doing so it relies on a
novel connection between the particular issue at hand and a stock meta-frame, about which
the target audience has already an established emotionally charged view.
In accommodative schemas, the narrator has to overcome resistance, and/or (purposely)
makes easy assimilation more difﬁcult. Where assimilative schemas can rely on the listener
agreeing with the narrator’s point, and seeking to remember experiences, evidence and sto-
ries that conﬁrm the narrator’s position, accommodative schemas, make for a harder sell.
The initial resistance will lead to a search for incongruities, counterarguments, and mis-
takes.45 The former entails the target asking the question “Can I believe it?,” the latter “Must
I believe it?” Within accommodative schemas it is worthwhile to distinguish between the
elicitation of outright adverse emotions and of conﬂicting emotions. The latter is the case
when communication elicits both positive, approach-oriented emotions and negative, avoid-
ance-oriented emotions. As will be noted below, this conﬂict is an important feature of the
reaction to victimological experience. Viewing victims can trigger sympathy and compas-
sion, but also disgust, fear, and distress at the same time.46
Narrative is a key ingredient in shaping emotions experienced as a collective. In a recent
review Bernard Rime emphasized the importance of sharing narrated emotions as a means
to establish bonds within communities.47 Indeed, much of the fabric of groups, communi-
ties, and even nations and cultures consists in these bonds. Where collectives may experience
emotional contagion when witnessing events or as a consequence of being in close proximity
to others, the two other main paths to collective emotional experience rely on narrative.48
Key events in collective memory are accompanied by a narrative—often supplied by a meta-
frame49—which gives rise to a shared appraisal of the event itself, its causes and consequen-
ces, its meaning and the emotions that are appropriate as a reaction to discussing this event.
Narrative is also an agent in experiencing emotions as a member of a collective. Narrative
connects personal experience to that of an encompassing cultural group (see below), and in
addition signals whether or not a particular event should rightly be experienced as a collec-
tive issue. Evidence is accumulating that emotions that are experienced in such a “we-mode”
have qualitatively different characteristics and associated action tendencies than emotions
experienced in “i-mode.”
Emotions, Victimization, and Radicalization
In a review, Rice noted the limited attention to emotions in terrorism research, which he
ﬁnds to reﬂect the inﬂuence of rational choice approaches prevalent in political science and
international security studies on the one hand50 and the similarly longstanding preoccupa-
tion with the individual pathology of terrorist perpetrators in psychological studies on the
other.51 Interest in the role of emotions in terrorism is increasing following the lead of the
scholarship concerning emotions in social movements and protest,52 conﬂict resolution,53 as
well as in politics and morality more generally.54 Rice mentions a number of different
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emotions that play a role in radicalization and terrorism: hate, humiliation, fury, disgust,
anger and moral outrage, shame and revenge, but also positive emotions such as pride, exhil-
aration, excitement, and ingroup love.
Understanding the concept of framing and its connection to assimilative and accommo-
dative schemas illuminates the manner in which communication functions in and around
radical political movements and terrorist organizations. A frame may highlight the organiza-
tion’s essence as a remedy for a particular problem or seek to glorify the movement’s “super-
stars.” It can also focus on deﬁning the problem and highlight the accompanying negative
moral judgment. In this drawing, a shared experience—a master-frame—of victimization is
often vital. Social movement theorist William Gamson has shown the power of so-called
injustice frames across contexts.55 These frames rely on a shared feeling of suffering injustice
and are particularly effective, not in the least because the accompanying emotion—anger—is
powerful, easily recognizable and directed toward action.56 As will be noted below, Vamik
Volkan’s work on the re-appropriation of particular positive (“chosen glories”) and negative
(“chosen traumas”) events in the current day and age offers similar insights.57
In turn, the literature on framing can expose much of the complexities in various avenues
toward the construction of counternarratives. First and foremost, it reveals the extent to
which arguments solely directed toward the “minds” err in viewing the matter as an almost
academic debate, rather than as an antagonistic struggle, guided by the emotional experience
and the identity of the parties in question.58 It can also serve to question the wisdom of a too
overt focus on the “voice of the victims” in counterterrorism policy. Where this was believed
to contribute to empathy with the emotional experience of victims, sympathy with their pre-
dicaments and perhaps even guilt and remorse on the part of offenders, it can have the unin-
tended effect of increasing hostility toward the victimized ingroup and strengthening the
resolve of those involved in terrorist activity. The notion that victims’ narratives will not
always meet with a sympathetic reaction has been repeatedly conﬁrmed across contexts and
forms of victimization.59 This can be contingent on the characteristics of the victimization
in question, with situations inciting disgust and other avoidant reactions, making a sympa-
thetic reaction more effortful and less likely.60 The difﬁculties in creating sympathy for vic-
tims are particularly acute when the people in question are more likely to be seen as
offenders. Their suffering is highly likely to be interpreted as a fair outcome of their own or
their group’s actions,61 as just deserts rather than unjust suffering. This is particularly impor-
tant in situations of so-called adversarial competitive victimhood.62 In prolonged conﬂict
between groups either side has reason to see each other as offenders rather than victims: tales
of suffering are juxtaposed against the suffering endured by one’s own ingroup and recast as
worthwhile retribution. Any further emphasis on the victim’s suffering is only likely to foster
hostility to the victim’s narrative, as it seemingly downplays in comparison to the suffering
endured by the ingroup.
Second, it emphasizes the futility of adopting counternarratives that require full-scale jet-
tisoning of the radicals’ identity. Here the narrative runs head ﬁrst into the deep-seated
desire to see the self as continuous and effectively benign. Instead, it supplies support for
recent research into so-called credible messengers.63 Their identity facilitates assimilative lis-
tening, while the accompanying narrative can serve to offer a different set of possible outlets
for the radicals’ grievances. As Braddock and Horgan recently wrote, “it can be particularly
useful to utilize individuals that agree with the themes that comprise a terrorist narrative in
principle, but dismiss the use of violence as a viable option for realizing those themes. These
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individuals may be uniquely suited for disseminating a counternarrative, given that they will
have the added credibility of agreeing with the terrorist group’s goals, if not its methods.”64
Instead of denying the sense of victimization and injustice and the emotions that accompany
this, successful counternarratives can draw on these emotional responses and what they rep-
resent but reframe the appropriate response to them.
Finally, the role of emotions in collectives and the use of framing in the actions, tactics,
and maintenance of social movements can enrich the understanding of how radical groups
form and maintain coherence.65 This can provide a worthwhile addition to the “bunch of
guys” literature,66 complementing its focus on social networks with the emotional and iden-
tity implications of membership of such groups and networks. This, in turn, offers the
opportunity to re-orient the focus of the work on the signiﬁcance quest from solely agentic
concerns and purposes to those that include the other elemental force in human motiva-
tion—communion.67 Much of the recent work on the so-called Big Two of human motiva-
tion suggests that we might often be asking the question “what does this social actor want to
achieve,” where the question “where does this social actor need to belong” might offer more
rewarding answers. The research into radicalization is—the authors think—no different.
Narrative and Culture
The construction of culture is largely narrative in nature.68 Collective memories concern his-
torical moments in a group’s existence, with narratives that institutionalize these memories
into coherent stories.69 The memory is not only continued through time by storytelling and
re-telling, but its narrative nature also emerges in the way collective memories are shaped
and re-shaped by current-day needs. Instead of understanding the collective memories of
the past as a ﬁxed canon, they are re-interpreted in light of present events.
These cultural narratives about national history, ethnicity, religion, and politics shape the
personal stories people live by, and these personal stories can sustain or transform culture.70
In other words, the interaction between culture and identity works through narrative. For
instance, Hammack71 deﬁnes identity as “ideology cognized through the individual engage-
ment with discourse, made manifest in a personal narrative constructed and reconstructed
across the life course and scripted in and through social interaction and social practice.”
Cultural narratives not only provide a sense of self-continuity but also continuity with the
other members of one’s community. As Hammack and Pilecki72 note, narrative provides the
solution “not only to a need to see oneself as the same from one day to the next, but also to
see oneself as engaged in a cognitive process that is the same as others within a particular
time and place.” Culture provides a menu of stories to which the person’s autobiographical
narrative can relate.73 Culture provides (implicit) deﬁnitions of what is and what is not nar-
rative, what is a good narrative, and the sites where telling narratives—or at least particular
types of narrative—is or is not appropriate.74
But individuals can also ﬁnd themselves struggling to square their own narrative with the
master narrative in society, and in some fundamental way ﬁnd themselves to be outsiders or
deviants.75 This is also and particularly true for those who go through sudden, life-altering
experiences that lead to “shattered assumptions” or “narrative ruptures.”76 The sense of
alienation from the master narrative of society, and the need to connect to others who share
similar experiences, goes a long way to explain the spontaneous emergence of self-help,
mutual aid, and/ or more explicitly politically motivated groups who have a particular
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 549
experience in common.77 Whether that is disease, addiction, or indeed victimization, this
experience, the view that only others with this experience can fully comprehend what the
individual is going through and in tandem the distance from the narratives the culture sup-
plies, underlies this self-organization, and forms the point of departure for the construction
of a group-based community narrative. The latter lies at the heart of sub- or
countercultures.78
Cultural Victimization Narratives and Radicalization
Most, if not all, points discussed in this article resonate in the relationship between culture
and victimization. Culture scripts can deﬁne what victimization is, how forms of victimiza-
tion are ranked, and what narrative the reactions to victimization ought to follow. Instances
of victimization can be seen as emblematic of or run counter to the master narrative, with
the latter varying in the extent to which victimization is embraced or not. In a study of Israeli
and Palestinian youths, for example, Hammack79 found that both groups imported the mas-
ter narratives from their cultures into their personal narrative identities. As a result, Israeli
youth were more likely to adopt redemptive scripts, seeing themselves as having overcome
previous victimhood, while Palestinian youth were more likely to use contamination scripts,
seeing themselves as becoming deeper encroached by victimhood. The adherence to different
scripts, Hammack argues, leads to difﬁculties in ﬁnding cultural common ground and estab-
lishing peace.
Although it is hard to ﬁnd a culture that does not have an emblematic tale of vic-
timhood, the extent to which stories of this victimhood become part of the social repre-
sentation of culture varies. Vamik Volkan’s80 analysis of large group identity suggests a
key role for chosen traumas, a shared mental representation of a massive trauma that
the group’s ancestors suffered at the hands of an enemy. These social representations
can also be put to use in times of conﬂict: the notion of competitive victimhood81
encompasses past narratives of victimhood, which are put to use in a similar way to
current instances of victimhood. In other words, to deliver a sense of moral entitlement
to the group, which by brandishing its views of victimhood attempts to gain support,
respect or as a cover for retaliation. Volkan ﬁnds the use of chosen traumas as the
main social representation of the group to be particularly activated in times of group
threat. Here the chosen trauma serves as an emblematic reminder of why the group in
question forged its key national, cultural, and/or ethnic identity in the ﬁrst place.82
Narratives of “chosen traumas” play a particular role in ideologically and politically
motivated violence. Volkan’s key text on the issue was titled Bloodlines: from ethnic
pride to ethnic terrorism. A whole host of terrorist movements invoke tales from a dis-
tant past. For instance, the modern day notion of martyrdom in Shi’ite-inspired terror-
ism often invokes the Battle of Karbala in 680 A.D., but similar tales can be found
across terrorist movements.
Much of this article concerns the narrative connection to culture in one way or another.
The main issue is the extent to which radicalization and terrorist activity draw on the master
narratives that certain cultures have to offer, or are developed in opposition as countercul-
ture or subculture. In the latter case the insights from cultural criminology can be usefully
marshaled.83 Here radicalization and even terrorist activity can be understood as another
form of deviance or opposition toward the master narratives of the dominant culture.84 The
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dominance of these master narratives can be perceived as an element of oppression itself,
with those adhering to the subculture as victims of this oppression.
A second and complementary avenue is that of self-organization and its connection to
community narratives in the aftermath of victimization.85 The narrative rupture caused by
victimization, also threatens the connection between the individual’s life narrative and wider
cultural narratives. In particular, it questions whether others who do not share the victim’s
experience can fully comprehend what the victim is going through. Communities of those
with similar experiences form as a means of self-help or mutual aid and in the sharing of
their individual narratives a communal narrative is shaped, as a means that can replace the
function of the wider cultural narrative. It might seem odd at ﬁrst glance to draw a link
between the peer support groups in the aftermath of life-threatening disease—that forms
much of the topic of the self-help literature—on the one hand and radical political move-
ments on the other. However, in both these seemingly disparate topics one can observe the
importance of coping with a sense of victimization, the difﬁculty in squaring one’s personal
experience with that of wider society and the importance of ﬁnding meaning in a
co-constructed shared narrative with others who have similar experiences. Engaging with
the literature from community psychology on this topic has much to offer.
Conclusion
This article has provided an overview of some of the pertinent issues concerning narrative
and explores it connection to the victimology of terrorism and radicalization. The main
issues of narrative that are worthwhile for further consideration in the ﬁeld of political vio-
lence are the following: It was ﬁrst noted that victimization is the emblematic form of “Trou-
ble” that forms the heart of narratives. Severe forms of victimization are likely candidates to
constitute the speciﬁc “negative” nuclear episodes in one’s life story. One’s identity and per-
sonal ideology are heavily inﬂuenced by these turning points, and the meaning one gives to
them. The construction of meaningful narrative in the aftermath of the shattering of
assumptions is, in turn, an important coping task. These victimization narratives can con-
cern personal experiences in a fairly recent past, but can also refer to vicarious, group experi-
ences, which occurred in distant history. These “chosen traumas” can become a key
component of group ideology, offering a short hand and a priori justiﬁcation for the acts
committed against those viewed as the erstwhile perpetrators.
Second, the effects of (severe forms of) victimization are best understood in terms of a
“narrative rupture,” which impacts victims’ sense of identity in terms of self-continuity
throughout time and in connection with others. Efforts to cope with victimization involve
narratively rebuilding this sense of continuity with the past and future selves and reconceiv-
ing the sense of communion with the social surroundings. This sense of narrative continuity
is also important in conceptualizing processes of disengagement and deradicalization. In this
regard, this article maintained that understanding victimization, radicalization, and deradic-
alization processes need to incorporate the idea that the life narratives involved are constitu-
tive elements of identity. The chosen traumas and ideology of radicals, extremists, and
terrorists are not mere (strong) attitudes or opinions, but form elements of their identity.
This article has noted the importance of incorporating the body of theory and research on
life narratives fully in the most well developed perspectives on radicalization and deradicali-
zation processes.
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Third, emotions are inherent to (understanding) the reactions to victimization, while victim-
ization narratives transmit these emotions. Empathy and sympathy play an important role in
understanding the reactions to victimization and the transmission of the emotions of victimiza-
tion experiences. The transmission, sharing and retelling of a wide variety of emotions experi-
enced relies (to a large part) on narrative. This article questioned the role of empathy for
victimization experiences as necessarily benign: victimization experiences of the “enemy” are
likely to be interpreted as just deserts for wrongdoing in the past. The phenomenon of compet-
itive victimhood suggests that the confrontation with these experiences is more likely to invite
a defensive response, including rehearsing one’s own or one’s own group’s victimization experi-
ences as outweighing those of the outgroup. In general, the transmission of emotion through
narrative is moderated by the division between assimilative and accommodative listening. In
the former, the listener is biased toward agreeing with the messenger, in the latter to disagree-
ing and/or viewing as negative. This also underlies the importance of the understanding that
who tells the story is as or sometimes even more important than what is being communicated.
Finally, narratives of victimization are important elements of culture. Culture scripts can
deﬁne what victimization is, how forms of victimization are ranked and what narrative the
reaction to victimization ought to follow. Instances of victimization can be seen as emblematic
of or run counter to a given society or community’s master narrative, but the authors are not
aware of societies that do not have at least one stock tale of their people’s victimization as an
important social representation. The notion of competitive victimhood encompasses current
and past tales of victimhood: the collective memories of past victimizations can be staple ele-
ments of a collective’s current master narrative, one that provides cover for moral entitlement
and even violent and retaliatory action. This article argued for further integration of the insights
of subcultural criminology and community psychology in the understanding of the way that
radical, extremist and terrorist groups draw upon or oppose master narratives in society.
As stated from the outset the goal was not to provide a full overview of all the manners in
which narrative approaches might contribute to research and theory concerning terrorism and
political violence. This article has restricted itself to illustrations of some useful applications of
this approach. Further and more in-depth exploration of the issues mentioned is undoubtedly
in order. In particular the notion of “life as narrative,” that is, the role of narrative in the con-
struction of life stories, is of key importance and is likely to enrich understanding engagement
and disengagement from terrorist activity and violent political extremism. This applies not to
theory alone. Much of the most interesting work into the experience of perpetrators of terrorist
acts and political violence relies on in-depth examination of individuals lives. Here narrative
approaches such as the life story interview, surely have much to offer.
In any case, the authors hope to have ignited interest in cross-fertilization between narra-
tive approaches and the topic of terrorism and political violence. This article was an initial
exploration of the use of these approaches. The authors deﬁnitely believe it should not be
the ﬁnal word.
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